

Annex B (normative)

Use of OID4VP to retrieve an mdoc

B.1 Mechanism description

B.1.1 General

This document supports presentation of mdoc using OID4VP, an extension to OAuth 2.0 as defined in Reference [8]. It enables the mdoc holder to present an mdoc directly to the mdoc reader. This document is an mdoc-specific profile of OID4VP defined in OID4VP, Draft 18. It clarifies mandatory-to-implement features for the options mentioned in OID4VP for the implementers who wish to present an mdoc response. Presentation of the mdoc shall use the same-device flow as defined in OID4VP, Section 3 with the Response Mode defined in OID4VP, Section 6.2.

NOTE 1 Cross-device flows are prone to engagement relay attacks which is the reason cross-device flow is not included in this document. This issue is not specific to OID4VP only.

NOTE 2 When implementing all requirements in Annex B, the mdoc acts as an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server towards the remote mdoc reader which acts as an OAuth 2.0 Client. OID4VP uses the terms Verifier for OAuth 2.0 Client and Wallet for OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server.

B.1.2 Sequence diagram




Figure B.1 — Engagement phase sequence diagram

Figure B.1 and Figure B.2 show the informative sequence diagram of the engagement phase and device retrieval phase. During the engagement phase, the mdoc receives the Authorization Request including the `request_uri` which is used by the mdoc to connect to the mdoc reader.

In steps 1 to 6, OID4VP does not define when the Request URI is generated and how the Authorization Request including the Request URI is presented on the web page. In step 4, a session was established between the user agent and the mdoc reader. In step 6, the user agent invokes the mdoc, for example, using the `mdoc-openid4vp` URL scheme and provides the Request URI as a URL query string parameter to the mdoc.




Figure B.2 — Device retrieval phase sequence diagram

During the device retrieval phase:

- In step 7, the mdoc fetches the Authorization Request Object from the Request URI received using a HTTP GET over Transport Layer Security (TLS) from the Request URI that was received in the Authorization Request (see [B.4.2.2](#)).
- In step 8, the mdoc reader receives the fetch request and then prepares and signs the Authorization Request Object associated with the Request URI (see [B.4.2](#)).
- In step 9, the mdoc reader returns the Authorization Request Object to the mdoc over TLS.
- In step 10, the mdoc verifies the JWT signature and validates the Authorization Request Object which includes determining whether the mdoc reader is trustworthy according to OID4VP, Section 5 and in RFC 9101:2021, Section 6.2.

- In step 11, the mdoc authenticates the user and asks user to consent to sharing the requested data elements with the mdoc reader.

NOTE 1 This step can be implemented in different ways.

- In step 12, the user is authenticated and gives consent.
- In step 13, the mdoc generates mdoc authentication, generates the `DeviceResponse` and prepares the VP Token.
- In step 14, the mdoc prepares the Authorization Response parameters and encrypts the Authorization Response Object as a JWE using the Verifier Metadata from the Authorization Request Object (see [B.4.2.3.2](#)).
- In step 15, the mdoc sends the encrypted Authorization Response Object (JWT) to the Response URI provided in the Authorization Request Object.
- In step 16, the mdoc reader processes the Authorization Response Object.
 - First, the mdoc reader decrypts the JSON Web Encryption (JWE).
 - Then, the mdoc reader identifies the associated Authorization Request.
 - Then, the mdoc reader parses and validates the VP Token containing the `DeviceResponse`. This includes validation of contained document types and data elements.
 - Then, the mdoc reader computes the `SessionTranscript` to verify mdoc authentication.
 - Then, the mdoc reader performs issuer data authentication and other remaining checks.
 - Finally, the mdoc reader prepares a Redirect URI including parameters required to verify the session binding. This can be a Response Code associated with the session (see in OID4VP, Draft 18, section 11.2).
- In step 17, the mdoc reader returns the Redirect URI including parameters to the mdoc over TLS.
- In step 18, the mdoc directs the user agent to open the Redirect URI including potential parameters.
- In step 19, the user agent requests the Redirect URI including potential parameters from the mdoc reader over TLS. In this step, the user agent uses the existing session with the mdoc reader.
- In step 20, the mdoc reader receives the Redirect URI including potential parameters and confirms the request is associated with the existing session between the user agent and the mdoc reader. This could include the verification of additional parameters such as a Response Code. The mdoc reader looks up the status and potential data of the Authorization Response associated with the current Authorization Request (i.e. transaction) and session.
- In step 21, the mdoc reader returns the status and potential data to the user agent which then displays the data to the user.

NOTE 2 The `AuthorizationRequest` in the OID4VP protocol is sent directly from the request endpoint of the mdoc reader to the mdoc without any intermediary applications. Since this message requires TLS for transport layer encryption, the `DeviceRequest` does not use application layer encryption. The exposure of `DeviceRequest` is limited to the connection between the TLS termination endpoint and the mDL Reader application.

B.2 Wallet invocation

The mdoc reader has the choice of the following mechanisms to invoke a mdoc acting as a Wallet:

- custom URL scheme as an `authorization_endpoint` (e.g. `mdoc-openid4vp://` as defined in [B.3.2.3.2](#));
- other mechanisms not described in this document.

B.3 Metadata exchange

B.3.1 General

OID4VP utilizes Wallet and Verifier Metadata, defined in OID4VP:2023, Section 8 and 9, to inform both the mdoc and the mdoc reader about each other's capabilities for the data exchange. This information includes details such as supported signature and encryption algorithms, and more.

The subsequent sections outline specific requirements and default values for Wallet and Verifier Metadata, particularly when the mdoc reader lacks prior knowledge of the invoked mdoc.

NOTE 1 The mdoc reader uses the Wallet Metadata, while the mdoc relies on the Verifier Metadata at different stages in the OID4VP flow.

NOTE 2 Since the OID4VP specification references the OAuth2 specification, all requirements in the OAuth2 specification with regards to HTTP connection settings and parameters apply to this profile as well.

B.3.2 Wallet Metadata

B.3.2.1 General

Before generating and sending an Authorization Request to the mdoc, an mdoc reader requires the Wallet Metadata.

B.3.2.2 Wallet Metadata parameters

An mdoc and mdoc reader shall support the following Wallet Metadata parameters as defined in [Table B.1](#).

Table B.1 — Wallet Metadata parameters

Parameter name	Value defined in this profile	Reference
<code>issuer</code>	The value for <code>issuer</code> is the Wallet identifier.	[15]
<code>authorization_endpoint</code>	The value for <code>authorization_endpoint</code> is the OAuth 2 Authorization Endpoint where the mdoc reader sends the Authorization Request.	[15]
<code>response_types_supported</code>	The value for <code>response_types_supported</code> shall contain the <code>vp_token</code> Response Type as defined in OID4VP, Section 5.4.	[15]
<code>vp_formats_supported</code>	The value for <code>vp_formats_supported</code> shall contain the <code>mso_mdoc</code> Credential Format Identifier.	OID4VP, Draft 18, Section 8.1
<code>client_id_schemes_supported</code>	The value for <code>client_id_schemes_supported</code> shall contain the <code>x509_san_dns</code> Client Identifier scheme. For example, [<code>"x509_san_dns"</code>].	OID4VP, Draft 18, Section 8.1

Parameter name	Value defined in this profile	Reference
request_object_signing_alg_values_supported	The value for request_object_signing_alg_values_supported shall contain all the request object signing algorithms that the mdoc supports.	RFC 9101
authorization_encryption_alg_values_supported	The value for authorization_encryption_alg_values_supported shall contain ECDH-ES and support all curves defined in Table B.8 unless the mdoc reader knows the set of curves that the mdoc that it interacts with supports.	[5]
authorization_encryption_enc_values_supported	The value for authorization_encryption_enc_values_supported shall at least contain A256GCM. For example, ["A256GCM"].	[5]

B.3.2.3 Obtaining Wallet Metadata

B.3.2.3.1 General

An mdoc reader utilizing this specification has multiple options to obtain the Wallet Metadata of an mdoc, as defined in OID4VP:2023, Section 8.2:

- The mdoc reader has a static and pre-configured set of Wallet Metadata parameters of the mdoc (see [B.3.2.3.2](#)).
- Alternatively, the mdoc reader can obtain the Wallet Metadata of the mdoc dynamically, for example, using Reference [\[15\]](#) or other out-of-band mechanisms.

B.3.2.3.2 Static set of Wallet Metadata

The mdoc shall support the following static set of Wallet Metadata parameters bound to the mdoc-OID4VP scheme (mdoc-openid4vp://):

```
{
  "issuer": "https://self-issued.me/v2",
  "authorization_endpoint": "mdoc-openid4vp://",
  "response_types_supported": [
    "vp_token"
  ],
  "vp_formats_supported": {
    "mso_mdoc": {}
  },
  "client_id_schemes_supported": [
    "x509_san_dns"
  ],
  "authorization_encryption_alg_values_supported": [
    "ECDH-ES"
  ],
  "authorization_encryption_enc_values_supported": [
    "A256GCM"
  ]
}
```

request_object_signing_alg_values_supported is not present in the static wallet metadata, since the static wallet metadata gives no indication about which alg_values are supported by the mdoc for request object signing.

NOTE 1 <https://self-issued.me/v2> above is a symbolic string.

NOTE 2 In the static set of Wallet Metadata above, `mso_mdoc` does not contain any JSON members which indicates that the mdoc can support any of the supported cryptographic algorithms for issuer and mdoc authentication defined in ISO/IEC 18013-5.

NOTE 3 If the mdoc reader has no prior knowledge of the mdoc or if the mdoc reader cannot discover the Wallet Metadata dynamically, it is expected that the mdoc reader uses the static set of Wallet Metadata as defined above.

NOTE 4 In order for the mdoc to be able to interact with an mdoc reader, it has to support the `alg_values` used by that mdoc reader for request object signing.”

B.3.2.3.3 mdoc-openid4vp URL scheme

This document registers the mdoc-openid4vp URI scheme defined in the IANA Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) Schemes registry, defined in Reference [13]:2023, Section B.3.2.3.1.

- URI scheme name: mdoc-openid4vp
- Status: permanent
- Applications/protocols that use this scheme name: the mdoc-openid4vp URI scheme is intended to be used by mobile document reader applications.
- Change controller: ISO/IEC JTC1/SC17
- Reference: ISO/IEC TS 18013-7 (this document)

B.3.3 Verifier Metadata

B.3.3.1 General

An mdoc needs the Verifier Metadata when generating and sending an Authorization Response to the mdoc reader.

An mdoc shall support receiving Verifier Metadata using the `client_metadata` Authorization Request parameter, as defined in OID4VP:2023, Section 5.

Both the mdoc and mdoc reader shall use the Verifier Metadata parameters from [Table B.2](#).

Table B.2 — Verifier Metadata parameters

Parameter name	Value defined in this profile	Reference
<code>jwks</code>	<p>The value for <code>jwks</code> contains the public key(s) of the mdoc reader. Each curve defined in Table B.8 shall be included unless the mdoc reader is aware of the set of keys supported by the mdoc it interacts with.</p> <p>The public keys are encoded as a JSON Web Key Set (JWKS) as defined in Reference [10].</p> <p>The <code>jwks</code> shall contain the keys used for mdoc mac authentication as defined in ISO/IEC 18013-5. The keys used for this purpose shall set the “use” JWK parameters to “enc” (see RFC 7515) and “kty”, “crv” to the corresponding values of “kty”, “crv” for each curve defined in Table B.8</p>	[12]

Parameter name	Value defined in this profile	Reference
	unless the mdoc reader is aware of the set of keys supported by the mdoc it interacts with.	
authorization_encrypted_response_alg	The value for <code>authorization_encrypted_response_alg</code> is used for the value in the <code>alg</code> JWT (JWE) header parameter in the encrypted Authorization Response.	[5]
authorization_encrypted_response_enc	The value for <code>authorization_encrypted_response_enc</code> is used for the value in the <code>enc</code> JWT (JWE) header parameter in the encrypted Authorization Response.	[5]
vp_formats	The value for <code>vp_formats</code> shall include a JSON object with the key <code>mso_mdoc</code> .	OID4VP:2023, Section 9.1

Additional mechanisms to obtain the Verifier Metadata and Verifier Metadata parameters may be supported but are out-of-scope of this specification.

The mdoc reader is not required to pre-register with the mdoc.

B.4 Data Exchange

B.4.1 Data Model

The data model shall be used as specified in [Clause 7](#).

B.4.2 Authorization request

B.4.2.1 General

The mdoc reader shall generate and deliver the Authorization Request as defined in OID4VP:2023, Section 5 to the mdoc and applies the additional rules of the OID4VP mdoc-specific profile defined in this document.

B.4.2.2 Engagement phase

The mdoc shall support receiving the OID4VP Authorization Request at the `authorization_endpoint` specified by the Wallet Metadata. The Authorization Request shall pass an Authorization Request Object by reference using the `request_uri` parameter as defined in RFC 9101.

The value for `request_uri` contains the HTTPS-based URL where the mdoc retrieves the Authorization Request Object that contains the Authorization Request parameters (see RFC 9101).

The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Request using the `mdoc-openid4vp` scheme:

```
mdoc-openid4vp:// ?client_id=example.com
&request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%2F567545564
```

The `client_id` Authorization Request parameter is included in the Authorization Request as a percent-encoded (as defined in Reference [6]:2023, Section 2.1) URL query string parameter. The `client_id` is also included in the Authorization Request Object as defined in RFC 9101.

B.4.2.3 Device retrieval phase

B.4.2.3.1 General

The mdoc uses the `request_uri` Authorization Request parameter to retrieve the signed Authorization Request Object as defined in RFC 9101:2023, Section 5.2.3.

The following is a non-normative example of a HTTPS request to fetch the signed Authorization Request:

```
GET /567545564 HTTP/1.1 Host: example.com
```

The following is a non-normative example of the HTTPS response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2020 23:52:39 GMT Server: Apache/2.4.43 (example.com)
Content-type: application/oauth-authz-req+jwt Content-Length: 797 Last-Modified: Wed, 19
Aug 2020 23:52:32 GMT eyJ4NW...
```

NOTE The example above does not show the entire HTTP response body to improve readability. The HTTP response body contains the signed Authorization Request Object encoded as a JWT as defined in [B.4.2.3.4](#).

B.4.2.3.2 Authorization Request parameters

The mdoc reader shall include the Authorization Request parameters from [Table B.3](#) in the Authorization Request Object.

The Authorization Request Object may contain the `state` Authorization Request parameter as defined in Reference [\[8\]](#).

NOTE As defined in Reference [\[8\]](#):2012, Section 3.1 the mdoc must ignore other unrecognized Authorization Request parameters.

Table B.3 — Authorization Request parameters (passed in Request Object)

Parameter Name	Value defined in this profile	Reference
<code>response_type</code>	The value for <code>response_type</code> is a Response Type value that is included in the Wallet Metadata parameter <code>response_types_supported</code> . For example, <code>vp_token</code> .	[8]
<code>presentation_definition</code>	The value for <code>presentation_definition</code> is the Presentation Definition object that specifies the mdoc data being requested. B.4.2.3.3 defines the content of the Presentation Definition object for this mdoc-specific profile of OID4VP.	OID4VP:2023, Section 5.1
<code>client_metadata</code>	The value for <code>client_metadata</code> is the Verifier Metadata parameter of the mdoc reader as defined in this document.	OID4VP:2023, Section 5
<code>nonce</code>	The value for <code>nonce</code> is a cryptographic nonce value and shall follow the requirements in B.5.3 .	OID4VP:2023, Section 5
<code>client_id</code>	The value for <code>client_id</code> is the Client Identifier of the mdoc reader that corresponds to the Client Identifier scheme.	[8]
<code>client_id_scheme</code>	The value for <code>client_id_scheme</code> is a Client Identifier Scheme that is included in <code>client_id_schemes_supported</code> Wallet Metadata parameter, e.g., <code>x509_san_dns</code> .	OID4VP:2023, Section 5

Parameter Name	Value defined in this profile	Reference
response_mode	The value for response_mode shall be direct_post.jwt as defined in OID4VP, clause 6.3.1.	[8]
response_uri	The value for response_uri is the HTTPS URL that represents the HTTPS POST endpoint for submitting the encrypted Authorization Response required by the Response Mode direct_post.jwt.	OID4VP:2023, Section 6.2
aud	The value for aud is the audience of the Authorization Request Object and is set to the issuer Wallet Metadata parameter.	OID4VP:2023, Section 5.6

An example of of Authorization Request parameters included in an Authorization Request Object using the x509_san_dns Client Identifier scheme is provided in [B.6.2](#).

B.4.2.3.3 Presentation Definition

A Presentation Definition object (as defined in OID4VP:2023, Section 5) used by this OID4VP mdoc-specific profile shall contain the JSON members from [Table B.4](#).

Table B.4 — Presentation Definition JSON members

Presentation Definition JSON member	Value defined in this profile
id	The value for id is a JSON String that is unique in the Presentation Definition of the Authorization Request.
input_descriptors	The value for input_descriptors is a JSON array of Input Descriptor objects. The Presentation Definition shall have at least one Input Descriptor object.

Each Input Descriptor object in a Presentation Definition object shall contain the JSON members from [Table B.5](#).

Table B.5 — Presentation Definition JSON members

Input Descriptor JSON member	Value defined in this profile
id	The value for id shall be set to the requested document type. This indicates that all requested data elements shall be selected from that document type. For example, ISO/IEC 18013-5 defines org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL as the document type for mDL. The Input Descriptor id shall be unique per Presentation Definition object. This implies that a document type can only be used once within the Presentation Definition. Example: "id": "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL"
format	The value for format is a JSON object which shall contain a JSON object with the key mso_mdoc. mso_mdoc shall contain a JSON member alg that contains a list of supported algorithms for issuer and mdoc authentication (as defined in ISO/IEC 18013-5) as listed in Table B.8 .
constraints	The value for constraints is a JSON object with the following JSON members: limit_disclosure, fields. limit_disclosure whose value shall be set to the JSON String value required.

Input Descriptor JSON member	Value defined in this profile
	<p>fields is a JSON array of Field objects where each Field is a JSON object with the following JSON members: path,intent_to_retain.</p> <p>path is a JSON array where each entry is a JSON String containing a requested data element from the requested document type as follows: \$('<namespace>')['<data element identifier>']. For example, to request a data element with an data element identifier family_name from the namespace org.iso.18013.5.1, the following JSON String is used: \$('org.iso.18013.5.1')['family_name'].</p> <p>intent_to_retain whose value shall be set to true or false.</p> <p>Example:</p> <pre> "constraints": { "limit_disclosure": "required", "fields": [{ "path": ["\$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['family_name']"], "intent_to_retain": true }] } </pre>

An mdoc and mdoc reader are only required to implement the syntax requirements related to the parameters of the Presentation Definition object that are specified in this document. An mdoc reader shall not include any parameters and values in the Presentation Definition object that are not defined in this document.

An example of an Authorization Request is provided in [B.6.2](#).

When data elements from multiple document types are requested, separate Input Descriptor objects per document type shall be present.

B.4.2.3.4 Client Identifier scheme

The mdoc reader shall select a Client Identifier scheme for the Authorization Request that is supported by the Wallet Metadata.

B.4.2.3.5 Authorization Request signing

The mdoc reader shall select a Client Identifier scheme that requires Authorization Request signing.

If the selected Client Identifier scheme requires Authorization Request signing, e.g. x509_san_dns, the mdoc reader shall encode the Authorization Request parameters as a signed Authorization Request Object encoded as a JWT. The Authorization Request Object shall contain and set the Authorization Request parameter require_signed_request_object to true. The signed Authorization Request Object shall contain an alg JWT (JWS) header parameter that matches one of the supported signature algorithms specified by the request_object_signing_alg_values_supported Wallet Metadata parameter.

For the x509_san_dns Client Identifier scheme, the Client Identifier shall be a DNS name and match a dNSName Subject Alternative Name (SAN) according to RFC 5280 entry in the leaf certificate passed with the Authorization Request Object. The Authorization Request Object shall be signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in the leaf X.509 certificate of the certificate chain added to the x5c JWT (JWS) header parameter of the signed Authorization Request Object. The Wallet shall validate the signature and the trust chain of the X.509 certificate. All Verifier metadata other than the public key shall be obtained from the

`client_metadata` parameter. If the Wallet can establish trust in the Client Identifier authenticated through the certificate, e.g. because the Client Identifier is contained in a list of trusted Client Identifiers, it may allow the client to freely choose the `response_uri` Authorization Request parameter value. If not, the FQDN of the `response_uri` value shall match the Client Identifier.

NOTE 1 The certificates included in the `x5c` JWT (JWS) header parameter are base64-encoded (RFC 4648:2006, Section 4) and not base64url-encoded. Further note that if the certificate chain includes only one certificate, the `x5c` JWT (JWS) header parameter is a JSON array with one entry.

NOTE 2 Since AuthorizationRequest in OID4VP is signed, a trust anchor is needed to enable trust in the signature. Self-signed mdoc reader certificates can support trust when they are already present in the mdoc via an out-of-band manner (which effectively elevates such a certificate to a trust anchor) e.g. dynamic registration.

B.4.3 Authorization Response

B.4.3.1 General

The mdoc shall generate and deliver the Authorization Response as defined in OID4VP:2023, Section 6 to the mdoc reader and applies the additional rules of the OID4VP mdoc-specific profile defined in this document.

The Authorization Response is sent to the `response_uri` endpoint as defined in OID4VP:2023, Section 6.3.1 using the Response Mode `direct_post.jwt`. The Authorization Response is encoded as a JWT (JWE) without nesting (see [B.4.3.3.2](#)). The JWT (JWE) is included in the `response` parameter as defined in OID4VP:2023, Section 6.3.1.

The following is a non-normative example of an Authorization Response sent to the `response_uri` endpoint:

```
POST /post HTTP/1.1      Host: example.org      Content-Type: application/x-www-form-
urlencoded              response=eyJra...9t2LQ
```

NOTE The example above does not show the entire value for the `response` Authorization Response parameter to improve readability.

The response of the `response_uri` endpoint shall include the `redirect_uri` parameter as defined in OID4VP:2023, Section 6.2.

B.4.3.2 Authorization Response parameters

An Authorization Response shall include the Authorization Response parameters from [Table B.6](#).

If present, the mdoc shall copy the `state` Authorization Request parameter from the Authorization Request Object to the Authorization Response Object (as defined in Reference [\[8\]](#)).

The Authorization Response is delivered encrypted to the mdoc reader encoded as a JWT using JWE compact serialization (see [B.4.3.3.2](#)).

Table B.6 — Authorization Response parameters

Parameter Name	Value defined in this profile	Reference
<code>vp_token</code>	The value for <code>vp_token</code> shall contain the base64url-encoded-without-padding <code>DeviceResponse</code> data structure as defined in ISO/IEC 18013-5.	OID4VP:2023, Section 6.1
<code>presentation_submission</code>	The value for <code>presentation_submission</code> shall contain the Presentation Submission object as described in B.4.3.3 .	OID4VP:2023, Section 6.1

An example of the Authorization Response Object Parameters can be found in [B.6.6](#).

B.4.3.3 Presentation Submission

B.4.3.3.1 General

A Presentation Submission object (as defined in OID4VP:2023, Section 6.1) used by this OID4VP mdoc-specific profile shall contain the JSON members from [Table B.7](#).

Table B.7 — Presentation Submission JSON members

Presentation Submission JSON member	Value defined in this profile
id	The value for <code>id</code> is a String with a value that is unique in the Authorization Response.
definition_id	The value for <code>definition_id</code> corresponds to the <code>id</code> value of the Presentation Definition object in the Authorization Request.
descriptor_map	<p>The value for <code>descriptor_map</code> shall be a JSON array of Descriptor Map objects with one or more entries where each entry corresponds to an Input Descriptor object in the Authorization Request.</p> <p>Each Descriptor Map is a JSON object with the following JSON members: <code>id</code>, <code>format</code>, <code>path</code>.</p> <p>The value for each <code>id</code> corresponds to the <code>id</code> value of the Input Descriptor object the Descriptor Map object corresponds to.</p> <p>The value for <code>format</code> shall be the static JSON String value <code>mso_mdoc</code>.</p> <p>The value for <code>path</code> shall be the static JSON String value <code>\$</code> if the VP Token contains a single JSON String or JSON object.</p>

An example of a Presentation Submission object referring to a VP Token with a single entry representing a DeviceResponse with a single document type can be found in [B.6.4](#).

B.4.3.3.2 Authorization Response encryption

The mdoc shall encode the Authorization Response as a JWT (JWE only) as defined in OID4VP:2023, Section 6.3. The JWT uses the JWE compact serialization as defined in Reference [\[9\]](#):2015, Section 3.1.

NOTE The JWT does not contain a nested JWS.

To generate the JWE, the mdoc shall use the `jwtks`, `authorization_encrypted_response_alg` and `authorization_encrypted_response_enc` from the Verifier Metadata. The JWE shall encrypt a JSON Object containing the Authorization Response parameters from [Table B.6](#). The mdoc shall generate a new JWE Initialization Vector (IV) for each encryption operation.

For example, if the `authorization_encrypted_response_alg` is set to `ECDH-ES` and `authorization_encrypted_response_enc` is set to `A256GCM`, this means Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman in Direct Key Agreement mode as specified in Reference [\[11\]](#) is used to encrypt the payload of the JWE.

The `jwtks` Authorization Request parameter is used to convey the ephemeral public key information of the mdoc reader to the mdoc which is required for key agreement. The mdoc generates a new ephemeral key pair and sets the value for the `epk` JWT (JWE) header parameter to the public key of the generated key pair-encoded as a JSON Web Key (see Reference [\[10\]](#)). When generating the ephemeral key pair, the mdoc has to ensure that the curve of the `epk` matches the curve of the mdoc reader public key specified by the `crv` and `key` JSON members (as defined in Reference [\[10\]](#)) of the JWK.

The mdoc reader shall set the `use JWK` parameter (public key use) to the static JSON String value `enc` and set the `alg JWK` parameter to the static JSON String value `ECDH-ES` to indicate which JWK in the `jwtks` Authorization Request parameter can be used for key agreement to encrypt the response (see Reference [10]).

The mdoc shall support at least one of the cryptographic curves as defined in [Table B.8](#). The mdoc reader shall support all of the cryptographic curves defined in [Table B.8](#).

The mdoc shall set the `apu JWT (JWE)` header parameter to the base64url-encoded-with-no-padding value of the `mdocGeneratedNonce` of the `SessionTranscript` as defined in [B.4.4](#).

The mdoc shall set the `apv JWT (JWE)` header parameter to the base64url-encoded-with-no-padding value of the utf-8 encoded nonce Authorization Request parameter from the Authorization Request Object.

The mdoc shall set the `kid JWT (JWE)` header parameter to the value of the `kid JWK` parameter of the public key that was used for key agreement to encrypt the response.

An example of the JWT (JWE) header of an encrypted Authorization Response can be found in [B.6.8](#).

An example of an encrypted Authorization Response encoded as a JWT (JWE) can be found in [B.6.7](#).

B.4.3.4 Error Handling

Error handling shall be supported as defined in OID4VP.

B.4.4 Session Transcript

The `SessionTranscript` as defined in ISO/IEC 18013-5 shall be used with the following changes:

- `DeviceEngagementBytes` is replaced with `null`,
- `EReaderKeyBytes` is replaced with `null`

The Handover element is defined as:

```
Handover = OID4VPHandover
OID4VPHandover = [
  clientIdHash,
  responseUriHash,
  nonce
]
clientIdHash = bstr
responseUriHash = bstr

clientIdToHash = [
  clientId,
  mdocGeneratedNonce
]

responseUriToHash = [
  responseUri,
  mdocGeneratedNonce
]

mdocGeneratedNonce = tstr
clientId = tstr
responseUri = tstr
nonce = tstr
```

where `clientIdHash` is the SHA-256 hash of `clientIdToHash` and `responseUriHash` is the SHA-256 hash of the `responseUriToHash`.

The `mdoc` shall set the value for `mdocGeneratedNonce` to a cryptographically random number with sufficient entropy (see [B.5.3](#)).

`clientId` shall be the `client_id`, `responseUri` shall be the `response_uri` and `nonce` shall be the `nonce` Authorization Request parameter from the Authorization Request Object.

An example of the `SessionTranscript` can be found in [B.6.9](#).

B.4.5 mdoc MAC authentication

To perform `mdoc` MAC authentication as defined in ISO/IEC 18013-5, the `mdoc` shall use one of the ephemeral public keys from the “`jwtks`” Verifier Metadata parameter as the “`EReaderKey.Pub`” with having the “`use`” JWK parameter set to “`enc`”.

NOTE “`EReaderKey.Pub`” acts as input to ECKA-DH to compute the shared secret to derive the MAC Key.

B.5 Security mechanisms

B.5.1 General

The following security architecture goals from [6.4.4.1](#) apply:

- Security mechanisms a), b) and c) apply directly.
- Security mechanism d) applies by sending the Authorization Response encrypted to the `mdoc` reader.
- The security mechanism defined in e) does not apply, however the protection against relayed engagement information is still achieved. The `mdoc` reader must maintain a binding between the user session bound and the `nonce` Authorization Request parameter. When the end-user is redirected back to the `mdoc` reader with the same `nonce` (included in `SessionTranscript`), the `mdoc` reader can detect whether there was no MITM attack.

B.5.2 Cryptographic curves

Besides the requirements for cryptographic algorithms from ISO/IEC 18013-5 for the `mdoc` and `mdoc` reader.

An `mdoc` and `mdoc` reader shall use one of the ECDH and/or signature algorithms from [Table B.8](#) for Request signing and Response encryption / decryption. The `mdoc` reader shall support all curves and algorithms defined in [Table B.8](#) for response object decryption.

Table B.8 — Cryptographic curves

Definition	Specification	Key type (kty value)	Signature algorithm (alg value)	Curve identifier (crv value)	Purpose
NIST P-256	Reference [11]	EC	ES256	P-256	ECDSA/ECDH
NIST P-384	Reference [11]	EC	ES384	P-384	ECDSA/ECDH
NIST P-521	Reference [11]	EC	ES512	P-521	ECDSA/ECDH
BrainpoolP256r1	Reference [7]	EC	ESB256	BP-256	ECDSA/ECDH

Definition	Specification	Key type (kty value)	Signature algorithm (alg value)	Curve identifier (crv value)	Purpose
			(with SHA-256)		
BrainpoolP320r1	Reference [7]	EC	ESB320 (with SHA-384)	BP-320	ECDSA/ECDH
BrainpoolP384r1	Reference [7]	EC	ESB384 (with SHA-384)	BP-384	ECDSA/ECDH
BrainpoolP512r1	Reference [7]	EC	ESB512 (with SHA-512)	BP-512	ECDSA/ECDH
Curve25519	Reference [14]	OKP	EdDSA	Ed25519/X25519	EdDSA/ECDH
Curve448	Reference [14]	OKP	EdDSA	Ed448/X448	EdDSA/ECDH

B.5.3 Entropy of the nonce

The mdoc DeviceResponse is securely bound to a particular session based on the fact that the nonces are not learned or guessed by the attacker. As such, nonces shall be an unpredictable random or pseudorandom value. Nonces shall have a minimum entropy of 16 bytes. A new nonce value shall be chosen for each transaction.

NOTE This applies to nonce and mdocGeneratedNonce.

B.6 Examples

B.6.1 OID4VP example — Presentation Definition

The following is an example of the Presentation Definition.

 Example: Presentation Definition

```
{
  "id": "mDL-sample-req",
  "input_descriptors": [
    {
      "id": "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL",
      "format": {
        "mso_mdoc": {
          "alg": [
            "ES256",
            "ES384",
            "ES512",
            "EdDSA",
            "ESB256",
            "ESB320",
            "ESB384",
            "ESB512"
          ]
        }
      }
    }
  ],
}
```

```

"constraints": {
  "fields": [
    {
      "path": [
        "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['birth_date']"
      ],
      "intent_to_retain": false
    },
    {
      "path": [
        "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['document_number']"
      ],
      "intent_to_retain": false
    },
    {
      "path": [
        "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['driving_privileges']"
      ],
      "intent_to_retain": false
    },
    {
      "path": [
        "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['expiry_date']"
      ],
      "intent_to_retain": false
    },
    {
      "path": [
        "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['family_name']"
      ],
      "intent_to_retain": false
    },
    {
      "path": [
        "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['given_name']"
      ],
      "intent_to_retain": false
    },
    {
      "path": [
        "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['issue_date']"
      ],
      "intent_to_retain": false
    },
    {
      "path": [
        "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['issuing_authority']"
      ],
      "intent_to_retain": false
    },
    {
      "path": [
        "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['issuing_country']"
      ],
      "intent_to_retain": false
    },
    {
      "path": [
        "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['portrait']"
      ],
      "intent_to_retain": false
    },
    {
      "path": [

```

```

        "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['un_distinguishing_sign']"
    ],
    "intent_to_retain": false
  }
],
"limit_disclosure": "required"
}
]
}

```

B.6.2 OID4VP example — Authorization Request Object parameters

The following is an example of the Authorization Request Object parameters. In this example and subsequent examples, the mdoc reader only contains a key for a single curve in the jwks structure. This is permissible only because for these examples it is assumed the mdoc reader is aware of the set of keys supported by the mdoc with which it is interacting.

 Example: Authorization Request Object parameters

```

{
  "aud": "https://self-issued.me/v2",
  "response_type": "vp_token",
  "presentation_definition": {
    "id": "mDL-sample-req",
    "input_descriptors": [
      {
        "id": "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL",
        "format": {
          "mso_mdoc": {
            "alg": [
              "ES256",
              "ES384",
              "ES512",
              "EdDSA",
              "ESB256",
              "ESB320",
              "ESB384",
              "ESB512"
            ]
          }
        },
        "constraints": {
          "fields": [
            {
              "path": [
                "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['birth_date']"
              ],
              "intent_to_retain": false
            },
            {
              "path": [
                "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['document_number']"
              ],
              "intent_to_retain": false
            },
            {
              "path": [
                "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['driving_privileges']"
              ],
              "intent_to_retain": false
            }
          ]
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}

```

ISO/IEC TS 18013-7:2024(en)

```
{
  "path": [
    "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['expiry_date']"
  ],
  "intent_to_retain": false
},
{
  "path": [
    "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['family_name']"
  ],
  "intent_to_retain": false
},
{
  "path": [
    "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['given_name']"
  ],
  "intent_to_retain": false
},
{
  "path": [
    "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['issue_date']"
  ],
  "intent_to_retain": false
},
{
  "path": [
    "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['issuing_authority']"
  ],
  "intent_to_retain": false
},
{
  "path": [
    "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['issuing_country']"
  ],
  "intent_to_retain": false
},
{
  "path": [
    "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['portrait']"
  ],
  "intent_to_retain": false
},
{
  "path": [
    "$['org.iso.18013.5.1']['un_distinguishing_sign']"
  ],
  "intent_to_retain": false
}
],
"limit_disclosure": "required"
}
]
},
"client_metadata": {
  "jwks": {
    "keys": [
      {
        "kty": "EC",
        "use": "enc",
        "crv": "P-256",
        "x": "xVLtZaPPK-xvruh1fEC1NVTR6RCZBsQai2-DrnyKkxg",
        "y": "-5-QtFqJqGwOjEL3Ut89nrE0MeaUp5RozksKHpBiyw0",
        "alg": "ECDH-ES",

```

```

        "kid": "P8p0virRlh6fAkh5-YSeHt4EIV-hFGneYk14d8DF51w"
    }
]
},
"authorization_encrypted_response_alg": "ECDH-ES",
"authorization_encrypted_response_enc": "A256GCM",
"vp_formats": {
  "mso_mdoc": {
    "alg": [
      "ES256",
      "ES384",
      "ES512",
      "EdDSA",
      "ESB256",
      "ESB320",
      "ESB384",
      "ESB512"
    ]
  }
}
},
"state": "34asfd34_34$34",
"nonce": "abcdefgh1234567890",
"client_id": "example.com ",
"client_id_scheme": "x509_san_dns",
"response_mode": "direct_post.jwt",
"response_uri": "https://example.com/12345/response"
}

```

NOTE While this example contains the state claim in the request, the subsequent response examples are made for a request where that state claim is not present.

 Example: Static Private Reader Key JWK corresponding to 'x5c' JWT Header

```

{
  "kty": "EC",
  "kid": "Cv_aKIPqB8mkHqcJGUFq7zawf5vAyA6xv3PdJpJY1V8",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "Xy4fnFl6uX1kX_QsKPFUZKfQADji2j91Aot2GNVQxxw",
  "y": "THuUCf0wJeJ--eKovzxUUSLU-1P04Nog1UhdKUWM6tg",
  "d": "5SOi-q3lIENTg-pyKeh3Vxhvu7IgyRm-IHPis2vfP8c"
}

```

B.6.3 OID4VP example — Authorization Request Object

The following is an example of the Authorization Request Object.

 Example: Authorization Request Object JWT (JAR) Header

```

{
  "x5c": [
    "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 ipqR7kIK1JdT"
  ]
}

```


rc86GQ1heBT-m3cHdsNo7c15eipTV0kYB5kYLnzI2O3DFyUKhdj-EFge7yv04JNhtPce4hpUIpkVh_311fG9
4C5uRwXIHoZq11Vcj_B111VogBAMj7GxinJ0LZ3pjuB5N3BSNGq_ebzlv1bEvcJt08Xlto3X4NkJJPE1TERwP
vUvg1GOctVPjCGDYsWtRM-HNCwU9RahC5wDd1H9roylVAqesaGwPhtcXlCkY3EHxhmosjgiz4vpJB5HVYPGJ
J7QSDq1xa5G0dezGQYlL6Y9It4mwOp0qpUCHvP0_egT-VwLE7Jns9eYv9ouwt6eG0MD26AIE2_QyNV3bfqNh
p-lvzpJGKstQtNudxURoD8ZNOBYDzhtedzcledHeUj-v6EogklF1zzP9zmKmau0ca8dQXB1tWAd9GMHPJRokB
WXADg0ljOVw8gmY6CMgtrQqfTdARG8XSGSNwE30TPchWdJ3Ls52HBZhxYGfED2FqxyBXpwTXCTGGMB7SjdrW
rx5se5xhxI9YHP0M2V73JF0udbL8BZKpiLV2fg5Dc8zKASKGJrm6HLbEIBWrKrIXKrgQ892nJMIbx7GRtRLuQ
ghf1EGxT2_WODUmhHePpIVNzgxUFZttWYOuzNYElGZEXrZ_k_WORC1JsgmyHIprYBX11-HW3TTPAh0Y2MYti_
D_TE77oXgKgyYCRPPhetcOHjUWCHRMR3soaDsMcTEEqIdiLPdDu5MuQ1mMYKbSyyv_Emkt-LkY1S7iuKcR8xQD
-SF6WVW0QvrjE7OXTsQVIugauMRAZ2x140h5_hu21oAm0t_gI4p7k62sgEt_zAt7q1h8tMZucmDqiN1cABGQW
6xazTbzQ6legSbKBYKOId5pQ2Q-4Hob-8iARedVi1h9f1hw-SGKxdeq3wYtT2-zbaneM-vps2-JiCYivtWnL
GRRnu38_jKJ01j7U1-xJbQu58QFvw9SbP0Yyu7Mxa2f21qlzCBElrkeA7VqUPVtWVYRTJD3euZL46hmLnJ7A
OEjwwGLNGoz4vhAQEjWXf715Mz60InUeNe9fWkKbPLXzWH_o87G1c2FvUwraH7rELCvFfX1fHITfiTcZ3XQ
e_qCqrUtK2Bj-92cLGp52sqO3CKm5alvzPsm9E2Q3hqC8vhX6JusmevvyNXmEZKNTKBEKUAHN0qMLQX9vkjtj
QsmAoN4dzLFpAM4ionIbcP39sVSBTm-p9cNF6TCTld_o_841SWV_o-oI1hpN2t3DVQug446jdBCr4e7pbaW66
RYJBDH8FeXah1SWYcH0Fu94IiwGMGq1KdyioaJjdtmW5Z2TaS_J_87VKlRkwE2DhZEYm8s7JzMTwvCHR26eg
ULENEQbyy4GXhxD1SaKMTiJGdJ_NEOmpwhfH7qBdC44bTGJjKN0snKwKr2Gzmb9Aep-v_2thsjSunL2n0frxS
ExUt5QkPULwn1hJO8H3GxWZprv34RiWx7wtzjdeeKCFGIM7r2HevXWLPt-y_7CwzNUII-fUqz6ZemsmZWovhv
3PjWmQvLwLLJA45n-R2ftFxmPx1U6I_VuK7NijDinh-L7IaYaV4XMgPvfHituIXDDRDD_Aj12Q2EhLzXEJDoz
NrSxPelDgY7bx-a_iVQX6tj9LgHudMm372BjTGHlXBrDvIsdKCSyEYvFhrJnBl-5jiusR89anfn51zVjP2cUt
t1UNsDpKs6t6H5ARh10QtUbGr6qRYeytdlBa1y5AOVxsDrnVEIOi0Vdokx7ZmLpzGWbXtYAqdvRzoNY6V33R
Y13Ms6DKjCjJ2nwgppJ5Z_q_jlF_nXlZ62EtSbf9QznNgGLWr4LJEG-cvc53V57hoNV1U_aATboKB2AW0gPpm
A8tHMnqi5fOMVxuYeW-zNH4HEJpV_2_HI7Rglte7ybSszuARLWR4yQDyDk4CBe2bdunHMhHJxMtUjj5SAdIZ7
0TUWj00DS0qU4MDQOB-aDom6uCK8BoGRila_TbwPPmW8TzkDX-_uuisfL7Cn4WKHWFd-Qjwd1Rmd1rgmMM6XW
9OdkFjzwYZ7-PO6yTzWyi0Tpgak1jdfzFDIZdeQ1KlRduc1PvfhybC8btTpChu3pLsQpGzcX4j07LDCi2GC
lgEpKZfR1vXmyiKmuizwL8y4PVglHSTwJJ-X5iXQJf1Vqb5F2aKzL1utibNDRHxPUfmjrvwnQWFOQle143Lm0
M5ShZ1k-eVAYv3DbNjK5QHVNPRnm9IQb1shRLpC3PzblT7mUTZHYqJ7ELm-0-AwnZ8HoA-JJA5eSWpfKe46d9
CIC1XCxn-fZg0_sjB4pYwR0SU822vKW141oTp-hrJX6wzTvYulDDB5sNppUTyv99ifJ6bDfsJtx-RuF6Y5yb2
OODQg7QNuGABXC2nJA5724dnUMFUiSpqTl_-hbJOHgr_VzWcZlnzPEkQ-trgUU2Fcn2UHNKVtyiPvPTH-LU21
CTxA7uYpS-0ITeNlTef2xzWNZ35q7JcrQ8SzCCqkIczGhTXazYcIsRdZOhYE3VZfYCRoKpQk10eLUOb2pVuX
-Yfa8zmPlrmwvA_3HmfvA87uQFzdt-RTthn3-vxHMgqUGnRjv1aJcFmTr6PRkQ31g0P7b8kDFbgan6nZ-2qaL
Qc0CIkAZ1kNFQdQm18qJ9mjd0cDQPcaq37U10LoGtrO_qX-eHS0e1idzbcBSwK_rQ_ktjusW5Be-PWL9D8Bj7
A-pbWniQuikXR3ub72_GJA10yeJ_2HIPbe1jGt_UjTjpopHDH5W1Je9ND0A8Tv0Bs3qUmmGW7Du9LFGqEcIpL
WaJejFWLQP_givObCwqZYH1Wnd_XQemS-wUiRPZmg0pTSEYSGjXTXSCDxyykrhI9Egmebg9p6JLfJ41m8gHyn
CI2iasdHfyUAZBQsKW2vYeU7IjRXvas2Z7-SbkKP4hvBuCJaZi_QxngNUE9--lk5NcabYEHuTmUDrxKqcdSj
SMtDVqRI-i8aOAMmQcDfcuZTa_Upu7-Ic1gEGDc02ZiTJQOY13SRf02sNbDLWo11QvdAlc1THVc4GfgCuw7p
_tDbQcaDNGzcCyjTTT4zKCVUFqnSaZ3psrLvpc5cB26hoyf_i4OHIBDPi6Rey7LG1FkxdZM7YE_6s28t9K_F
0vtVqm816izt-23o8r_0t8Z7CgzOEkMxGQHLX_0YuhWvP2FzDFkHfJmrmf97J412dHogACzoVsW5G78i7R1
6iL40xmJanZWg3Hqy2h5q700zSbQG2G39e6-h6flwaoXHi-U94R9yGImmOxXktWrPeogWzQrTp9A61yu6KQm
bh5m_NJXgmwEOHTpA0DpwwkRli5spshw0NoPhd5Hc9QuB_er8PcEUIoWiZHmpFC7Axwo5j5wz50JUQKFvXhtZ
dFNLETzK2NGVYaFEQ2hAcROwPkJLv0e4skP55uxmcrFl_mdC_-mHwpxrpr9Y3KfeSPZL0Bs1kkXGB1Z_7VnLp
w07-6SONGm3U10p856jeDNCd9mrfe5BpgnruTneWx2mDUS9wLELIYgmPsOQYvO-PYvn73vusZpqhluFOEoaOZ
d7PMzYm52Nwpr43G04ZK9IiaDF_TwK_GTrKOPXuIk-ZzzZ9SDyowxz3PX4OLT4Q5SEEB2UT0a6_2kD07dSWQX
VyWZo0x09yBja7PVClaDtlb1WxDZv0212W101wNdmSAGOPut7CwNokzdsX8iVLWGpFYZMdW71ooJtxuOgCiXU
9R28H8hyZ7LRLR8xOFU8b9bC8Suwf501xejeXyG9DYFV6cKep604SuGzQMAWf_qFHR1JtKiQnKeFr8XvQ2Eno
DOcfq4ykNm532ENyS0m0nIS1qfql5F7qGaS8N7X_jnFJU8vBjeQ-DafMDEeuQ1C6e9tTbrgh2-9sqMwk6P5n5
ep5Iz4AXt5GY01d7dBfOcXSFy30YynokuZon5eC3LtQlHirvVRi0NhwvFbMVD_m_UgiznV6nDCUL2fe0WWgWS
7hGJTlyqt8uPddB2U6EOMB2oZKdCAWC4j77sP8RAIM6Je-0DwoqjMVo665sqedTRnwYPNAbnXhWANHmbmRINp
BJOu3Mcsq2PIJbWtTCSRnWRC4J1fn3nK4EB3P06HnYrR9_Ct66fmDeU4azi9OorHFOTewBLxoplrsfob0G1U
gwe3qsj4vFDCRZhwfhZacDVowofQ3enzKmguiYOo_HtHbt4PbYaK_jsOsVT8D35shFDWyo21zhJhj-K4vJI4i
T7fz958c0CA0K9KkqCD8Iwh2H3sZ1-ASqJH4zWgml61xVJw9ponuicL1-nYXy3SekbETDnT3O8KtRcd2geY
13g8bN-fgqZ6oGXkn7nyBmypeESHmYcAKSr1VXZDHdy9yRrsZV54yf8sA0w2bp03ionrSggr4Nisj4QCIPmVA
WCyZP4PKcq6k-rzz4QrIjOtajk9CzHrklmsOm4uUARHyBETZqOthipne_YNxr_000UoikIzUAjgQyHCY3T14Y
J1sJfSLCU_tkLh19NFRySqcNyTcycepbzsM64u5hIaDorH99eBa24dbwPTYqxQkzNSdGBYqbTQ_AvuHob78b9
cU8MjcS0CgyaLjpPoHgAYX_YLehw-VwBdtqv_LFyJKR3y9RuRmq8uQI8qfLegXw9bmNpEun41jKmOPURjLqUu
2BXVkcKSAMMBzpxZMg4sqYLGEdpKwfoANY4dJKJaz-OGTF0ntkRU4z011R55tLcFp-OrCJjMq3zLoXdq4Nhh
xrsohD08uEYqKpcDKqWjxf_6Bdk_WdXBNKjNUT8DDfOKTbDcdwFPcPqVNVcX017pyWD7j0SgUdDv54bFqHJ4
jQHLORxbThsMJZT-adFikd-ych_uq1ClVHr2k-QkbUzXoq81kqofmTFWnOag355_40p361G8qShSv6NVEhgF
FRKvFrR6BdV5MNhEXTPyRnBh1I9BSZayHwSy4AOajehSi-5h7K21lfgkwyDTK5uteQ7o41a5jeKZsnHvtB_-wq
vdgfPlcntoYf1QsLXUMpzoIkFUEVfymePG6Nnz8KW0J4AuxJr8r0GNh9_js-sxwTmGPW1EqpqHLbI08WEHGvE
681FwwiWtTubFWSW6arfVRuKSVHegucAm9y9G9jZcBxDLAG2j3ONNDRIvy54S-_skpR5AKpNsqqp5JbQ47PGSzd
HM7poE2R4cbtbp06U-uZrGSobCa2JaeCvsJnJulroYk_5gNbvN0Iux6Zz_BvHO5JZGNcnI7ayYQrpvixufRZ
Aua62N5IfgNbxarrUHfTTT8aT8E1xX1D-9CHFzWfYgBrtJ-GjTA-6BrKf5iFdWOYyQm4MIwHwpyMIE1VhopP
FXeDNRDALAXo1UP1fcJRGDTWr_LXC6qFbProiFhBdn8TH33ysdfms7ix01ihzdWJgP_-vLgVNLQI1AmtW1m06

jkETfrPRk_AqR2iL0wqhwpT7yWtQqzG9uecsCthSQfjT1r6BUIjioie59gOo6b1VvagYUWu87idPQIvtR4AjT
 3YBTI6dRIXgdFeAlx_JyL011095e4gswHFbPp-HWpncjtJg1iEpNwYwUnYVRMInkylyf-knP_GoI6FVhgIHNg
 50KhnPYZ7VesNfUmQD5MhsgtUg20rUMMZ2uTIDb0Be-1hNyJ-U3OsSsz5CjoRylxcdhot0S2MjziwR_nLR-Qe
 5AFSB70UCE7j3oCiXE8rsYD59wD-2ye_c2RyvHDeDxUtuKtIyvRwsVHHB2bP_Uu-oNnV41YApCZmqpaYn7pLw
 dlEW3xGxQCa-e0qx6bvtbgI-14xn7r5ykwkcUAGowkobFEYpl_7R3PyvvpNHcUu0QeEjq6FQcrLwNKVcAOYcN
 nPOt-s0qTiOwIlnOofUjffjFftgF2j97HeKbE5XJU1MXW9gxrLN3Dn3Vk2dc-sn-TX42gylJMvWNWnD0XFxkfc
 W9L8QJ0Ypt6uq5fLCVX2xxZ0BxOtUDZRzCUeN_py_s1PxChcQ-tJEOjFFCq1yo-IrJLdhbaUA2J61uhsy_Ovc
 S_IHPI8QrhN-i6ntPk0Gkw0ghfwBpZh_zupLJyqjILwIPY6iHx1y1H05pQiAuRbbR6e_ZeawLvafEDFId12l
 aLzTFpuvTQYcgwJw5YKNT6EwslYrPOqFCs731SJFj8BEWBkJDRf2IpmYJicjLU0MKM078imD6sMHRUuEB7Fy
 lvdYbxEOPCfeT4yLgvuhpojrrcwaE4nmXME1FZivQ0abUIqCZkcIXhPF8egtVYOpIsRdoe1667WecyuCOLIDJ
 vNws6g1NWNzjJ1wjhKkR00oiXnwhi04ME1k0maQqNp9hYDuPl8VYqFBSNBdc270sq5Ib5ddLx1-8On0gNWLek
 AdRu_E99a_9IaQLf-ThlIZX9hDLlwiq67nRKZcrEL9v0qH7BGbhWjTNM1o2-OqXF_MZ7NF0bmjgQ2WMMhz404
 X2nbP2b_FnVBgB_O8TL1_cmm5W0r-Tdq_xN2vjjQFogmVusavFh1JReAJz9gWBy4CLWaEjGRwJR69q2KNAgV5
 ELetm0970KB-KHbbPJcCT81YN074WpyCEHyZtIfrgnIwDby-pmXSzBqLILKZAbuPm0WmaOXbr_DiDC9OAhTe7
 2v2qER68PNDIzw0qNuTb1mb2U_tLPVAWzX3KV-.xJEEAiKbR_t024nKHOpnwQ

B.6.8 OID4VP example — Authorization Response Object JWT (JARM) Header

The following is an example of the Authorization Request Object JWT (JARM) Header:

 Example: Authorization Response Object JWT (JARM) Header

```
{
  "alg": "ECDH-ES",
  "enc": "A256GCM",
  "apu": "MTIzNDU2Nzg5MGFiY2RlZmdo",
  "apv": "YWJjZGVmZDZgXmJmM0NTY3ODkw",
  "kid": "P8p0virRlh6fAkh5-YSeHt4EIV-hFGneYk14d8DF51w",
  "epk": {
    "kty": "EC",
    "crv": "P-256",
    "x": "laKMarZ1tDtdJV0fmSivSI2dhGyOJilIZcXjdsheEfM",
    "y": "jwiLJu_o4PlxGg0RS3zjjT7g3mNcydj5Vc0n5Neby0Y"
  }
}
```

 Example: Ephemeral Public MDOC Key JWK

```
{
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "laKMarZ1tDtdJV0fmSivSI2dhGyOJilIZcXjdsheEfM",
  "y": "jwiLJu_o4PlxGg0RS3zjjT7g3mNcydj5Vc0n5Neby0Y",
}
```

 Example: Ephemeral Private MDOC Key JWK

```
{
  "kty": "EC",
  "crv": "P-256",
  "x": "laKMarZ1tDtdJV0fmSivSI2dhGyOJilIZcXjdsheEfM",
  "y": "jwiLJu_o4PlxGg0RS3zjjT7g3mNcydj5Vc0n5Neby0Y",
  "d": "va3r09wvZrIqD27Se3t7R6DVbx6cHiKdzsXVyxQJP90"
}
```

 Example: IACA Certificate

-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
 MIICGjCCAb+gAwIBAgIKfgh/NiWv9JsIdDAKBggqhkJOPQQDAjBFMQswCQYDVQQG
 EwJWJUZzEpmCcGAlUEAwgSVNPMTgwMTtNSBUZXR0eS1lcnRpbWljYXRlIElBQ0Ex
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

B.6.9 OID4VP example — SessionTranscript

The following is an example of the SessionTranscript:

```
-----  
Example: OID4VPHandover CBOR Hex  
-----  
835820DA25C527E5FB75BC2DD31267C02237C4462BA0C1BF37071F692E7DD93B10AD0B5820F6ED8E3220D  
3C59A5F17EB45F48AB70AEECF9EE21744B1014982350BD96AC0C572616263646566676831323334353637  
383930  
  
-----  
Example: SessionTranscript CBOR Hex  
-----  
83F6F6835820DA25C527E5FB75BC2DD31267C02237C4462BA0C1BF37071F692E7DD93B10AD0B5820F6ED8  
E3220D3C59A5F17EB45F48AB70AEECF9EE21744B1014982350BD96AC0C572616263646566676831323334  
353637383930
```